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Compliance with social norms requires neural signals related both to the norm and to deviations from
it. Recent work using economic games between two interacting subjects has uncovered brain
responses related to norm compliance and to an individual’s strategic outlook during the exchange.
These brain responses possess a provocative relationship to those associated with negative
emotional outcomes, and hint at computational depictions of emotion processing.Life’s unfairness is not irrevocable; we can help
balance the scales for others, if not always for
ourselves.
—Hubert Humphrey
The late Hubert Humphrey was making a political
appeal in this quote, but the same language highlights
one important feature of our social instincts—humans
have an automatic drive to ‘‘balance the scales’’ for social
wrongs perpetrated on themselves and others. A large
bully takes the lunch money of a smaller child; a huckster
sells defective goods to a mentally challenged person,
and so on. Such scenarios can motivate us to act on
behalf of the wronged person—whether we do or not is
another issue. But it’s the instinct that’s most interesting
because it displays our deep connection to others—basi-
cally, we want to balance the other person’s ledger. Social
debts to you have representation in my nervous system in
such a way that I may be willing, at a cost to myself, to
seek some kind of repayment from the bad actor that
wronged you. It’s an old story chronicled throughout
history, but it suggests that our nervous system values
the experiences of other individuals, compares them to
expected norms, and generates the desire to act if the
other person’s experience differs too much from the norm.
Modeling Others
The capacity to richly model other agents should be
expected in any sufficiently complex social creature that
must estimate the intentions and actions of others. But
to sense a ‘‘social debt’’ requires specific computational
substrates: (1) a shared norm about what is expected,
(2) the capacity to detect ongoing deviations from that
norm, and (3) the capacity to do this from a third-person
perspective, that is, from the point-of-view of the offended
individual. Without these basic capacities, we would not
reasonably expect a creature to be able to even sense
norm violations, much less care about them when they
happen to others. This list is obviously not complete, but
a creature possessed of these abilities can better guess
the likely internal states and likely actions of others and14 Neuron 56, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.consequently can make better decisions in the context
of others.
But here’s the interesting point. Our nervous systems
do more than simply model the recipient of a social
offense; our nervous systems ‘‘care’’ about these offenses
to the extent that we are motivated to ‘‘right the wrong’’ for
the other person. To be motivated to balance the ledger
for an unrelated individual and to possess neural
responses related to such drives highlights the impor-
tance of uncovering the neural underpinnings of fairness
instincts, altruism, and the many other social sentiments
that fall into this category (Rilling et al., 2002; Sanfey
et al., 2003; de Quervain et al., 2004; King-Casas et al.,
2005; Delgado et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2006; Spitzer
et al., 2007 [this issue of Neuron]).
Given these observations, how can one probe fairness
instincts in humans using neuroimaging? In recent years,
this genre of question has been addressed using eco-
nomic exchange games in combination with either PET
scans or functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
The games have a variety of names—the well-known pris-
oner’s dilemma, the dictator game, the ultimatum game,
the trust game, and so on (Axelrod, 1984; Guth et al.,
1982; Roth, 1995; Camerer, 2003). They are excellent
experimental probes because they are simple and
mathematically well-specified, there is an existing body
of behavioral data employing them across a variety of
contexts, and there are known solution concepts for
how they ‘‘should’’ be played by a rational self-interested
agent (Roth, 1995; Camerer, 2003; Camerer and Fehr,
2006). Most importantly, they all require participants to
model their partner.
Fairness Games Expose Norms
and Their Error Signals
OK, so the economic games are quantitatively prescribed
and possess known optimal or near-optimal solutions. But
the really important part of their structure is the require-
ment to model the other player. To do so, players must
share reasonably similar norms for what constitutes an ex-
pected behavior, and this requirement holds before any
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an example.
The ultimatum game involves two players—the pro-
poser and the responder (Guth et al., 1982), and could rea-
sonably be renamed ‘‘take-it-or-leave-it.’’ In this game,
the proposer is endowed with some resource (say $100)
and can offer any split to the responder. Let’s suppose
the proposer offers $80 for herself and $20 for the
responder. If the responder accepts the split, then both
players walk away with money (‘‘take it’’ option). If the re-
sponder rejects, neither player gets anything (‘‘leave it’’
option). Rationally, the responder should accept all non-
zero offers since they start with nothing, but experiments
show this expectation to be false. In practice, the proposer
sends $40 as their modal offer and responders reject 50%
of the time at an $80:$20 split.
The neural responses engendered by this game are pro-
vocative because of their relationship to neural responses
measured during negative emotional events. In fairness
games like the ultimatum game, at the revelation of the
proposer’s offer, the anterior insula of the responder’s
brain activates parametrically to offer level and by doing
so correlates with the degree of unfairness in the offered
split (Sanfey et al., 2003). This response also covaries
with the probability that the responder will reject the offer,
thus providing a neural signature for the likelihood of
punishing the proposer at the responder’s expense. The
importance of the responses to this fairness game derives
from the vast array of other task demands that also
activate this same region of the insula. These include
hunger, thirst, anger, moral and physical disgust, sadness
(induced by scripted stories), dread of future shock, antic-
ipation of emotionally aversive events, pain, a host of other
interoceptive events, and the list goes on (e.g., Phillips
et al., 1997; Ploghaus et al., 1999; Damasio et al., 2000;
Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2002, 2005; Berns et al.,
2006; Stein et al., 2007). Lesions in this region have even
been linked with a decrease in the ability of smoking
cues to elicit craving in smokers (Naqvi et al., 2007; Dani
and Montague, 2007; Gray and Critchley, 2007). A
question naturally arises: what kind of computation would
respond similarly to such a spectrum of stimuli; one that
ranges from physical disgust to unfairness in a monetary
exchange game?
We think that a computational depiction of these data is
warranted and sheds light on a new study from Fehr and
colleagues in this issue of Neuron (Spitzer et al., 2007).
The idea is motivated by a variety of findings, but a recent
result by Preuschoff et al. (2006) (Figure 1) using an eco-
nomic task points the way to a model, which we sketch
in Figure 2. In this experiment (Figure 1A), the aim was to
track separately hemodynamic responses to the expected
value and variance of a future reward (money). This exper-
iment showed that well-known dopaminoceptive struc-
tures in the striatum possess ongoing hemodynamic
signatures related to both expected value and variance
of the future payoff (Preuschoff et al., 2006). But another
important finding was that bilateral anterior insula alsoshowed an ongoing hemodynamic response to the vari-
ance in payoff (i.e., risk) and to an error signal related to
this variance (also see Preuschoff and Bossaerts, 2007;
Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007).
Connecting Norm Error Signals
to a Range of Emotions
If we back up slightly from the specifics of this financial
task, we can combine these observations with those of
the ultimatum game (Sanfey et al., 2003) that show
anterior insula sealing with the degree of unfairness of
the proposer’s offer, that is, how much the offer differs
from some shared norm across the two players. These
experiments point the way to a broader view of the com-
putations available at the level of the anterior insula. The
simplest one-dimensional version of the idea is that
a norm along some behavioral dimension is being com-
pared to an ongoing estimate along that same dimension
derived from the creature’s actual experience (red and
green curves in Figure 2). The game to play is this: the
creature should want to express a behavior and/or
changes in its internal states to match the estimated distri-
bution to the norm. The technical method used to do such
matching is not important here, but we note that natural
‘‘error signals’’ for matching one distribution to another
are errors in the first two moments of the distributions,
that is, errors in the means and variances of the distribu-
tions. We also leave open the issue of whether the animal
seeks to move the estimate to match the norm or moves
the norm to match the estimate or both.
As noted above, a wide range of negative emotional
events activate this same brain region as well as changes
or forecast changes in interoceptive states (Paulus et al.,
2003; Critchley et al., 2004; see Craig, 2002, 2005 for
reviews). This suggests the hypothesis that these emotions
are underwritten by error signals along some norm distri-
bution, suggesting that emotions like disgust, pain, thirst,
anger, and so on represent feelings associated with their
own unique error signals used to direct the organism to
‘‘zero’’ them by changing its behavior and/or internal
states. This class of idea has been bruiting about the
literature in different forms but less committed to a compu-
tational interpretation (Critchley et al., 2004; Gray and
Critchley, 2007; Stein et al., 2007). However, we suggest
that the economic game results recommend a more gen-
eral situation where each emotional state is associated
with specific norm error signals that guide the matching
of some estimated distribution to the stored norm.
Matching a Norm through the Threat
of Enforcement
These ideas will mature in the coming years, but they point
the way to the current paper by Spitzer et al. (2007). This
paper examines the behavioral and neural correlates of
norm compliance. To comply with any norm, a nervous
system must possess a representation of the norm and
a capacity to decide whether the norm is being met, that
is, error signals related to the norm. Compliance withNeuron 56, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 15
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(A) Timeline of events for two-card task. Subjects place a bet about whether a second card will be higher or lower than the first card. There are only ten
cards and this bet is placed before seeing either card. At that time, the probability of reward is 1/2.
(B) After the first card is shown, the expected value of reward scales linearly with probability of reward p while the variance scales quadratically with p.
The two insets show activations in ventral striatum to expected value of payoff (top, orange activations) and variance of payoff (bottom, blue activa-
tions). The insets show plots of expected value of reward versus probability (top) and variance of reward versus probability (bottom) both for the left
ventral striatum.
Adapted from Preuschoff et al. (2006).social norms is really never quite voluntary. An individual
can be compelled by some internal norm and guided by
natural error signals related to it (e.g., guilt). Alternatively,
an individual can also be coerced through signals from
other agents like institutions or individuals around them
(Fehr and Gachter, 2002). These signals and their relation-
ship to our societal norms form one of the most important
and interesting parts of human cognitive activity, but one
for which detailed neural data has been sorely lacking
(but see de Quervain et al., 2004).
In their paper, Spitzer et al. (2007) look at the behavior
and brain activity of subjects playing a variant of the dicta-
tor game in two separate conditions (Figure 3). In both
conditions, each player is endowed with 25 monetary
units (mu’s). In the no-punishment condition, the first
player (A) decides how to split an additional 100 mu’s
between herself and player B. In this condition, player B
has no chance to punish. In the punishment condition,
player B can ‘‘buy’’ punishment units in a 5:1 ratio. For
example, if player A were to keep the entire 100, player16 Neuron 56, October 4, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc.B could spend her 25 mu’s to wipe out player A’s entire
stake.
Not surprisingly, subjects in this experiment transferred
on average more mu’s in the punishment condition than in
the control condition. During subject A’s decision period,
and contrasting punishment versus control condition,
Spitzer et al. (2007) found increased activation in the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), ventrolateral prefron-
tal cortex (VLPFC), bilateral orbitolateral prefrontal cortex
(OLPFC), and caudate nucleus.
Two findings stand out in this study. Brain responses in
OFC, DLPFC, and caudate correlated significantly with
changes in amount transferred across conditions—here,
differences in the amount transferred between punish-
ment possible and punishment not possible conditions
served as the monetary measure of norm compliance.
OLPFC has previously been implicated in the evaluation
of negative stimuli, while DLPFC activates during tasks
requiring cognitive control (Miller and Cohen, 2001). The
second standout finding was the response that correlated
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Machiavellian score. The Machiavelli score is based on
a questionnaire and asks subjects if they agree with state-
ments such as ‘‘It is hard to get ahead without cutting cor-
ners here and there.’’ There was a strong correlation in the
lateral OFC and insular cortex between differential activa-
tion across punishment conditions and the Machiavelli
scores. This finding plugs right into our preceding discus-
sion about the computations available at the level of the in-
sular cortex. By definition, a strong Machiavellian impulse
deviates significantly from the norm.
One may rightly ask if the social context matters in the
punishment condition. The authors conducted an addi-
tional control experiment in which the player A played
Figure 2. Norm Errors Provide Natural Computational
Substrate for Emotions
(A) To detect and correct norm violations there must be a representa-
tion of the norm along the relevant dimension(s) (green curve). To com-
pare the creature’s current estimate of its state to the norm, some
mechanism must at least be able to sense and correct the difference
in the means and variances in the distributions.
(B) By changing its behavior and internal states a creature can match
its estimated distribution along q to the norm for that dimension. The
exact mathematical mechanism for how this is accomplished is not
important here, but note that either the estimate and/or the norm might
change to effect this matching.
(C) In this panel, the capacity to represent the norm has been lost,
and so the creature’s nervous system cannot generate errors related
to the mismatch between its estimate and the norm. In this case, one
might also expect no ‘‘corrective’’ feelings associated with the miss-
ing norm. This case is reminiscent of recent work by Naqvi et al.
(2007) (see also Dani and Montague, 2007) where lesions to anterior
insular cortex caused subjects to ‘‘forget to want to smoke.’’ For
some reason, the missing insular cortex correlated with an inability
of smoking cues to elicit error signals related to craving (Gray
and Critchley, 2007). This account would show that minimally
such subjects would not have norm error signals necessary for
such feelings.a computer (and were told they were playing a computer)
programmed to punish with the same distribution as hu-
man subjects. In the regions activated in the punishment
versus no-punishment conditions, the R DLPFC and R
OLPFC exhibited significantly more activation in the social
context. Whether this is a simple arousal effect (‘‘people
are more important as opponents’’) remains to be seen.
This study extends significantly our understanding of the
neural processes involved in decision making during
active social interactions. In particular, this study shows
that areas recruited in evaluating threat and exercising
control are employed in this task at a level beyond that
in a similar interaction with a computer. More intriguingly,
this study shows that there is a very specific functional
neural difference between high-Machiavellian and low-
Machiavellian types. I guess we shouldn’t be surprised.
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